Water Law Review
Volume 13

Issue 2

Article 10

1-1-2010

Jerome C. Muys, George William Sherk, Marilyn C. O'Leary, The
Utton Transboundary Resources Center, University of New Mexico
School of Law, Model Interstate Water Compact
Daniel Snare

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.du.edu/wlr

Custom Citation
Daniel Snare, Book Note, Jerome C. Muys, George William Sherk, Marilyn C. O'Leary, The Utton
Transboundary Resources Center, University of New Mexico School of Law, Model Interstate Water
Compact, 13 U. Denv. Water L. Rev. 405 (2010).

This Book Notes is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Denver Sturm College of Law at
Digital Commons @ DU. It has been accepted for inclusion in Water Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital
Commons @ DU. For more information, please contact jennifer.cox@du.edu,dig-commons@du.edu.

BOOK NOTES
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Transboundary Resources Center, University of New Mexico School
of Law, Model Interstate Water Compact, University of New Mexico
Press (2009); 528 pp; $75.00; ISBN-13 978-0826346285; hardcover.
INTRODUCTION
The Model Interstate Water Compact (the "Compact"), by authors
Jerome C. Muys', George William Sherk, and Marilyn C. O'Leary, is a
comprehensive model act intended to address the myriad of challenges
and issues facing individual states, tribal nations, and the federal
government in administering transboundary water resources.
Over the past twenty years, the bitter struggles over the supervision
of interstate water systems throughout the United States significantly
increased. 2 In response, the United States Senate Committee on
Energy & Natural Resources, then chaired by former Senator Pete
Domenici, approved a grant in 2000 for the Utton Transboundary
Resources Center at the University of New Mexico School of Law to
draft a model compact to address the problems facing the states.3 As
part of the effort to draft the document, the authors, together with the
Utton Advisory Committee, held two separate national conferences
beginning in 2002, in which over seventy distinguished scientists and
This
lawyers, tribal, federal, and state representatives attended.4
Compact is the result of that collaboration.
The United States Supreme Court holds original jurisdiction over
disputes between two or more states, thus bringing the states before the
Court to adjudicate problems that arise under the various water
compacts within the United States.' However, the Court reiterates that
such disputes "are more likely to be wisely solved by cooperative study
and by conference and mutual concession on the part of the
representatives of the states so vitally interested in it then by

1. In Memoriam, Jerome C. Muys (1932-2009); your friends and colleagues will
sorely miss your contribution to Water Law scholarship and to the legal profession.
2. JEROME C. MuYs, GEORGE WILLIAM SHERK, MARILYN C. O'LEARY, THE UTTON
TRANSBOUNDARY RESOURcES CENTER, UNIVERsrrY OF NEW MExIco SCHOOL OF LAW, MODEL
INTERSTATE WATER COMPACT
COMPACT].

3. Id. at xiii.
4. Id.

5. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 2.

xii (2009)

[hereinafter MODEL INTERSTATE WATER
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proceedings in any court however constituted."' Therefore, according
to the Court, states should turn to the Compacts Clause of the United
States Constitution, rather than the judiciary, to settle their differences
in the administration of transboundary water resources.'
Currently, there are twenty-six water allocation compacts in effect,
predominantly in the West, and most date over fifty years old.8 As
populations increase and the demands upon water resources increase
with them, it is increasingly clear that the legal frameworks of these
compacts are inadequate. Therefore, the Compact's primary goal is to
provide a mechanism to resolve interstate water conflicts in an
amicable, efficient, and equitable manner.9 More specifically, the
Commentary suggests that the Compact's development follows the
contours of the Equitable Apportionment Doctrine, as embodied by the
Supreme Court's jurisprudence, and attempts to mirror how the Court
would address particular compact issues.'o The Compact intends the
states to take the primary self-governance role in the administration and
enforcement of interstate water compacts, a role they traditionally have
not assumed. 1 If states can refrain from Constitutional litigation, then
they can avoid significant inefficiency and expense.
This book note briefly summarizes the Preamble and each of the
eleven articles of the Compact and their corresponding commentaries,
highlighting only the most significant and controversial provisions.
PREAMBLE
The Preamble asserts the basic principle that the states' greatest
concerns lie with the river basins in their respective territories;
therefore the states should exercise primary authority over them
through integrated and adaptive management. 2 The Commentary
reinforces this concept by stating that the goal of the Compact's
Preamble was to set the political, legal, philosophical, and practical
It stresses that cooperative state
underpinnings of the Compact.
action is the only sure way to achieve optimum management of the river
basins. 14 It further notes that the Compact responds to the Court's
repeated admonishments that the states should seek agreement
between themselves, as opposed to seeking resolution before the Court.

6. MODEL INTERSTATE WATER COMPACT, supra note 2, at xiii (citing New York v. New
Jersey, 256 U.S. 296, 313 (1921)).
7. U.S. CoNsT. art. 1, § 10, cl. 3.
8.

9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.

MODEL INTERSTATE WATER COMPACT, supranote 2, at xiii.

Id. atxv.
Id. at 5; see also infraArticleI.
Id.at xiii.
Id.at 1.
Id.at 3.
Id.
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ARTICLE I: COMPACT PURPOSE, WATER SUBJECT TO COMPACT
AND SIGNATORY PARTIES
The Compact affects the equitable apportionment of the surface
flows and hydrologically connected subsurface waters of a basin located
within the states that are parties to the Compact. 5 The Compact also
establishes the Water Resource Management and Water Quality
Protection Programs. 6 The necessary signatory parties to the Compact
include the individual states, the United States, Indian Tribes, and
Pueblos. 17
The authors believe that the river basin is the optimal geographic
planning area for Compact purposes, and therefore reject the idea of a
"water common." 8 The river basin, instead of a water common, is
desirable because states can best achieve interstate cooperation by
addressing discrete interstate watersheds, thus fostering certainty and
simplicity of administration.
Additonally, the authors argue that
agreements between compact commissioners or between the state
legislatures themselves, are better equipped to address the broader
regional issues.1 9 Notably, left unaddressed in the Compact are isolated
interstate aquifers not hydrologically connected to surface waters, but
the authors urge that the concepts
expressed in the Compact apply
2 °
equally to these resources as well.
In terms of what waters the Compact's provisions will not govern,
the Compact provides that the signatories may designate certain
segments of land or quantities of imported or "developed" water for
exclusion from the Compact.21 If the signatories choose to exclude
such water, they must explicitly identify those waters and provide a
reason for their exclusion. 2 Indeed, the authors favor the exclusion of
developed water, so long as the water does not commingle at any time
or point with native basin water.
ARTICLE Hl: EFFECTIVE DATE AND DURATION OF COMPACT
The Compact becomes effective after ratification by the legislature
or governing bodies of the signatory parties and by the enactment of
Congressional consent legislation.24
Such consent legislation must
contain a waiver of sovereign immunity by the United States to allow for

15.

Id.at 4.

16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 6 (defining a water common as a planning unit that includes areas affected
by a particular basin, but rests outside of its boundaries; the authors give the example of
the City of Denver being a major user of Colorado River Water, but resting outside of
the Colorado River basin).
19. Id.
20. Id.(emphasis added).
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.at 7.
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enforcement of federal Compact obligations.2 5 The waiver provision is
necessary so that the effect of any subsequent federal legislation on
interstate compacts is ascertainable, and the parties can decide whether
they want to withdraw or terminate the Compact.2 6 The Commentary
asserts that even if the United States does not consent to the Compact,
litigants may seek to join the United States to any litigation as an
indispensible party.27
In the past, the United States existed as an indispensable party when
it exercised exclusive federal water allocation authority," or when it
acted as the trustee of tribal or pueblo water rights.2 9 However, the
United States is not an indispensable party if it holds water rights that
originated under state law," or when the sole basis of the federal
government's involvement is through the ownership and operation of
Bureau of Reclamation and Army Corps of Engineers projects.3 1 The
Commentary identifies the open issue of whether the federal
government's operation of a comprehensive regulatory scheme (e..
The Clean Water Act ("CWA")) would make it an indispensable party.
The basic idea is that Compact signatories do not want the United
States, as a signatory party, to claim sovereign immunity as a defense
against enforcement of Compact obligations. This concern is especially
apparent in light of the wide array of environmental protection
legislation the United States Congress has enacted over the past thirtyfive years.33 The federal government has waived liability in other
compacts it consented to, and the authors see such waiver as an
essential safeguard to the other signatory parties.34
The initial duration of the Compact is twenty-five years.35 This
"sunset" provision differs from most compacts in that the traditional
approach allows the agreements to last in perpetuity. 36

The principal

argument for a limited term is to allow for flexibility because either the37
Compact may no longer serve the interests of the federal government,
or changed circumstances could lead state
legislatures to view the
38
Compact as no longer in their best interests.
One year prior to expiration, signatory parties must notify the

25.
26.
27.

Id.
Id. at 9; see also infraArticle XI.
Id.; see also FED. R Crv. P. 19.

28. Id. (citing Arizona v. California, 298 U.S. 558, 571 (1936)).
29. Id. (citing Texas v. New Mexico, 352 U.S. 991 (1957)).
30. Id. (citing Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U.S. 589, 629 (1945)).
31. Id. (citing Idaho v. Oregon & Washington, 444 U.S. 380, 390-91 (1980)).
32. Id. at 10 (citing The Federal Water Pollution Control (Clean Water Act), ch.
758, 62 Stat. 1155 (1948) (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (2000))).
33. Id.at 10.
34. Id
35. Id. at 7.
36. Id. at 11.
37. Id. (The authors argue that the federal government may wish to enact legislation
that would abrogate certain parts of the compact in the future.)

38.

Id.
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President of the United States and Congress of their intent to either
extend the Compact for an additional twenty-five years (with or without
any amendments), or to terminate the Compact entirely. 39 Importantly,
should the signatory parties not renew the Compact or all parties
withdraw, all rights gained under the Compact and any financial
obligations incurred, follow the respective parties after dissolution.4 °
The parties can only complete a modification or amendment to a
Compact provision by utilizing the same procedures required
for
41
ratification by the parties, which include Congressional consent.
Some commentators have noted that the twenty-five year term may
be too short for the signatory parties to recoup any meaningful portion
of costs incurred as a result of Compact participation. However, the
authors counter that any such obligations will follow the parties and
would necessarily
be satisfied, regardless of withdrawal or termination of
42
the Compact.
Furthermore, individual party withdrawal is permissible following
two years' notice to the remaining signatory parties.43 This gives the
states the option to "go it alone," despite litigation being the
unattractive and sole alternative in the event of a conflict.'
The
authors believe the risks of participation in the Compact substantially
outweigh the risks inherent in litigation before the Court.45

The

authors, however, feel it is important to provide the withdrawal
mechanism in order to give parties the option to leave the Compact if
they choose.46
ARTICLE III: DEFINITIONS
This article defines a short list of sixteen terms recurrent
throughout the Compact"7 and classifies them into two distinct
categories: structural terms and apportionment terms.48 The authors
explicitly chose a short list of definitions as opposed to a comprehensive
one 49 because amendment to the Compact would be necessary to
modify any definition, which is a cumbersome and time consuming

39. Id. at 7.
40. Id. at 12.
41. Id. at 8.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 13.
45. Id. (citing Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 558, n.24 (1963)).
46. Id.
47. Id. at 15-16 (defining: (1) Advisory Committee, (2) Base Apportionments, (3)
Chargeability, (4) Commission, (5) Conjunctive Use, (6) Council, (7) Dispute
Resolution, (8) Division of Scientific Analysis, (9) Perfected Water Right, (10)
Reasonable Beneficial Use, (11) Safe Annual Yield, (12) Species and Habitat Protection,
(13) Subsurface Water, (14) Supplemental Apportionments, (15) Water Quality
Protection Program, (16) Water Resources Management Program).
48. Id. at 18.
49. Id. at 17.
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process." Keeping the list of defined terms short satisfies the need for
discretion, authority, and flexibility in the Compact. 1
ARTICLE IV: THE UTrON5 2 RIVER BASIN COMMISSION
In general, the Compact establishes the River Basin Management
Commission ("Commission") to supervise the implementation of the
Compact and to serve as the overall governing body.53 The Compact
authorizes the Commission to exercise the powers enumerated in the
Article necessary to manage, implement, and enforce the provisions of
the Compact and the obligations of the signatory parties. 4 The
Commission is responsible for the equitable, efficient, and sustainable
use of water apportionments. 5 It is also ultimately responsible for the
administration of the Water Resources Management Program, as well as
the Water Quality Protection Program. 6 It further establishes rules for
meetings of the Council, the Advisory Committee, and the Division of
Scientific Analysis ("Division").
The Commission also institutes the
voting requirements and privileges of the individual signatory parties.58
The Commission may review appeals from decisions by the Council and
the Division.5 9 Finally, decisions by the Commission constitute final
agency actions.60
The Commentary reveals that the Commission's structure is
flexible, but some form of established administrative entity is
desirable.6 1
Ultimate authority vests with Commission members;
however, the Council and the Division should only make policy
decisions within their area of expertise, unless the Commission
expressly assumes jurisdiction over important issues or hears an appeal
from parties before either subordinate body.6 2 The dominant theme is
that the Commission needs broad powers to accomplish its mission of
coordination and cooperation, which it can more efficiently achieve
through flexibility, discretion and delegated authority to respond to
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. The word "Utton" is for representative purposes only and states would replace
the name based on the respective river basin the Compact governs. See also MODEL
INTERSTATE WATER COMPACT, dedication page ("[t]he Utton Transboundary Resources
Center's Model Interstate Water Compact is dedicated to the memory of Professor
Albert E. Utton, whose practice of preventative diplomacy and authorship of
'Transboundary Groundwaters: The Bellagio Draft Treaty' brought to reality his values
of inclusivity and mutual respect in the sustainable management of transboundary
natural resources.").
53. Id. at 19.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 20; see also infraArticles VI & VII.
57. Id. at 24.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 25.
62. Id. at 26.
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changing conditions, such as drought or climate change."
The Compact gives the Commission several noteworthy enumerated
powers. One such power is the ability to facilitate voluntary inter-basin
transfers and water banking provisions. 64 Another is the power to levy
and collect taxes upon signatory parties as necessary to fund its
operations.r 5 Finally, the Compact provides for the ability to address
and facilitate mitigation of pollution in the basin.' 6
The Commission consists of the governors of the signatory states, a
single tribal representative to speak for all tribes holding water rights in
the basin, and a single federal Presidential appointee representative.67
The authors believe that the addition of the tribal representative is
particularly necessary because tribal nations enjoy sovereign status and
hold substantial water rights throughout the United States, especially in
the West. 68 The federal representative is also of particular importance
given the number of federal regulations promulgated and the amount
of vested water rights the United States holds.69 Indeed, the Compact is
convertible into a Federal Compact if the United States becomes a
signatory, in which the federal representative has voting rights, and the
representative has the ability tobind individual federal agencies, such as
the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA").70 Some commentators
have objected to this idea, however, noting that the federal Compact
representative should not have the authority to curtail the discretion
enjoyed by individual federal agencies, because to do so would upset
the settled expectations of parties under their jurisdictions and would
also unbalance the authority inherent within the federal regulatory
scheme. 7'
Aside from the Commission, the Council includes the two highest
ranking state officials involved in overseeing water allocation and
management, two tribal representatives with expertise in the area of
water management, and two federal representatives selected by
interested federal agencies.7 2
The Council focuses on the
implementation of the Water Quality Protection Program and the
Water Resources Management Program.73 Further, the Council sets the
price of supplemental apportionments and enforces Commission
decisions among the signatories.74 The Commentary notes that this
body, while not having a governor as a member, gives state, federal, and
tribal administrators an important role within the Compact's
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

Id. at
Id. at
Id.at
Id.
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id.at
Id.
Id.

27.
21.
20.
19.

27.
32.
34.
35-36.
22.
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Next, the Division consists of an equal number of members from
the signatory parties who possess expertise in hydrology, computer
modeling, storage, diversion, economics, quality, and fish and wildlife
habitats. 6 This body provides multidisciplinary technical support to the
Commission and the Council. 77

The Commentary reports a strong

consensus among the members of the Utton Advisory Committee "that
developing and employing generally accepted scientific data" to balance
out plentiful political input is essential to realistic interstate water
management. 7 Although contrary to the experience of many water
practitioners, the Division must adhere to strict timelines for the
delivery of their scientific findings. 79 This body represents the authors'
recognition' that water law requires scientific expertise to reach levels of
effectiveness. The authors further recognize that elevating science to a
higher standing in the administration of compacts is essential to the
future success of interstate water compact administration. 80
ARTICLE V: INTERSTATE WATER APPORTIONMENTS
The Compact allocates base apportionments of the total water in
the basin to each signatory party. As the authors explain, base
apportionments are the quantities of water necessary to: (1) maintain
stream flows as needed to fulfill requirements of applicable federal,
state, and tribal laws; (2) maintain healthy and productive basin-wide
ecosystems; and (3) provide additional flows as necessary to satisfy the
requirements of all perfected water rights under federal, state and tribal
law. 8' The Compact expresses base apportionments as a percentage of
the estimated safe annual yield of the whole basin. The Commission
calculates the percentage of total safe annual yield for each signatory by
compiling an average of the following: (1) seasonal and annual flows
for the entire record; (2) the driest ten-year period for the entire
record; and (3) the wettest ten-year period for the entire record. Then,
the Commission will adjust the percentage to compensate for any
existing storage capacity. 8 2 Within three years of the effective date of
the Compact, individual signatory states may petition the Commission
to increase their base apportionment to include water rights perfected
before the effective date.
The Commentary extensively justifies the authors' base
apportionment methodology. The authors assert that the principal
shortcoming of traditional compacts is their failure to protect and
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

Id. at
Id. at
Id.
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id.
Id.

27.
23.
31.
34.
27.
38-42.
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maintain adequate in-stream flows ("ISF") not subject to subsequent
diversion or consumption8s The authors make ISF the first priority in
establishing a signatory party's base apportionment. 85 Indeed, by
determining base apportionments as the quantity of water necessary to
"maintain stream flows as needed to fulfill all perfected water rights,"

the authors hope this methodology will serve as substantial inducement
to water right holders to support their state's participation. 6 Some
commentators have criticized that current unadjudicatedIndian water
rights represent an extremely large quantity of water, which the
Commission may not appropriately account for in determining base
apportionments. 8 7 However, the authors believe that despite the large
amount of water rights held by tribal nations, once fully adjudicated,
the total volume of water ultimately awarded will add up to much less
than that claimed by the tribal nations. 88 Therefore, an appropriate
compromise is to include the maximum amount of water the tribes
actually use in the initial base apportionment calculation, and once the
individual states fully adjudicate any implicated tribal water rights, the
Commission may award a subsequent supplemental apportionment if
necessary.89
The Commentary also argues that the authors' use of the safe
annual yield methodology in determining base apportionment (as a
percentage of flow volumes) is desirable due to the ease of
measurement for monitoring purposes, efficiency, and its ability to
easily allocate risk between upstream and downstream states. 90 Further,
the authors assert that using this method to achieve a reasonably
reliable baseline referent would avoid the problems encountered
during compact negotiations in the early nineteenth century, where
reliable scientific data was sparse and states had an incentive to
exaggerate their projected needs. 91 The goal in using a percentage is to
avoid distribution of basin water that does not exist by avoiding setting
base apportionments as specific volumes of water for delivery.
Aside from base apportionments, the Compact authorizes the
Commission to make supplemental apportionments of water, which are
waters in excess of the original total base apportionment originally
thought present.92 These supplemental apportionments are not free,
however, and the Commission awards supplemental apportionments in
five-year increments subject to Council and Commission approval. 93
Any supplemental apportionment must include water conservation
requirements,
but
states
can
transfer
these
supplemental
84.

Id. at 45.

85. Id.
86.

Id. at 46.

87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.

(alteration in original).
at 48.
at 44.
at 43 (referring to the negotiations of the Colorado River Compact).
at 38-42.
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apportionments, at a reasonable markup, to other states.94
The Commentary acknowledges that it is very controversial to allow
the Council to set supplemental apportionment prices.9 5 However, the
authors recognize the economic value of water as a market commodity,
and believe that facilitating the burgeonin practice of water marketing
between states is a beneficial practice. 9 Therefore, the Compact
incentivizes conservation by allowing the sale of surpluses.97 The
Commission would only charge for previously uncommitted water, and
not for water to satisfy perfected rights or water needed to comply with
other laws. Additionally, the Commission retains the right to subject all
supplemental apportionments to Commission review.98
The Compact requires states, within three years of the effective date,
to implement a measurement system for the extraction and
consumption of subsurface water hydrologically connected to surface
flows. 99 States cannot include these subsurface flows in their base
apportionment, but can charge them against surface flows in an attempt
to preserve ISF. 100 The authors assert that most compacts fail to address
the relationship between surface and subsurface water.'0 ' Because more
reliable scientific knowledge exists regarding the hydrological
interconnectivity of subsurface flows, the authors feel the Compact
should account for this interconnectivity to reach a more representative
Some
understanding of total water available in the basin. 02
commentators, however, have suggested that the study and
system for subsurface flows in only
development of a measurement
03
three years is unrealistic.1

The Compact also deals with the situation of shortage, where the
base apportionment percentage allotted to each state turns out to be
insufficient. If future available water deviates "substantially" from the
original estimates of safe annual yield, the Commission may make
equitable reductions in the perfected use rights of the individual
signatory state water right holders. 10 4 In determining equitable
reduction amounts, the Commission must apply criteria that take into
account the allocation of water among signatory states in times of
shortage; any reductions would only take place after basin water reaches
a minimum trigger threshold. 10 5 Additionally, unless states agree to
another method, the Commission reduces states' apportionments on a
pro rata basis in the event of any future federal environmental
94. Id.

95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.

Id.at 49.
Id.at 49-50.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 38-42.
Id.
Id.at 51.
Id. at 52.
Id.

104. Id. at 38-42.

105. Id.
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10 6
programs that diminish basin safe annual yield.
The most important provision of Article V is the requirement that
the Commission investigate each signatory state's legal standards and
procedures for determining what constitutes a "reasonable beneficial
use" of water. 1 7 To the extent reasonably practicable, each state must
make reasonable beneficial use of its base and supplemental
apportionments pursuant to Commission recommendations.08 Failure
of a state to make reasonable beneficial use of its apportionments
authorizes the Commission to reduce the state's base apportionment or
supplemental apportionment, and to make the reduction available to
other signatory parties. °9
The Commentary addresses this controversial provision in some
detail. It notes that the application of the reasonable beneficial use
standard is neither uniform nor aggressively enforced in prior
appropriation or regulated riparian r6gimes." ° The authors believe
that the principal source of 'new' water will be from conservation
efforts, and uniform application of the reasonable beneficial use
standard will greatly increase conservation results."' In keeping with
the Compact's devotion to the Court's precedent, the authors assert
that the Court has endorsed its conversationalist view, and believe that
the standard "lays on each [state] a duty to exercise her right reasonably
and in a manner calculated to conserve the common supply."1' 2
Furthermore, "the states have an affirmative duty under the Doctrine of
the
Equitable Apportionment to take reasonable steps to conserve...
3
natural resources within their borders for the benefit of others."1
The Commentary notes that the Compact's approach in requiring
the Commission to review the reasonable beneficial use standard in
each signatory state and provide recommendations for improvement is
proper because the Commission only makes recommendations." 4 The
authors do not intend the recommendations, however, as a "one-sizefits-all" remedy. 15 Another signatory is the only entity capable of
complaining of another's waste due to failure to comply with
Commission recommendations." 6 In such a case, the Commission,
following notice and hearing, has the authority to reduce the wasting
state's base apportionment by an amount equal to that which the

106. Id.
107. Id.; see also supra note 46 (The Compact defines "reasonable beneficial use" as
"[tihe application of water to a beneficial use in an amount reasonably necessary to
satisfy such use under state, federal or tribal law.").
108. Id. (emphasis added).
109. Id.
110. Id.at 52.
111. Id.
112. Id.at 53 (citing Colorado v. New Mexico, 467 U.S. 310, 328-29 (1984); Wyoming
v. Colorado, 259 U.S. 419, 484 (1922)).
113. Id.at 53-54 (citing Idaho v. Oregon &Washington, 462 U.S. 1017, 1025 (1983)).
114. Id.at 54.
115. Id.
116. Id.
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offending state could have reasonably conserved, had that state
followed the Commission's recommendations.' 1 7 In this situation, the
complaining state would carry the burden of showing waste by clear and
convincing evidence."'
The authors recognize that this scheme is highly controversial and
may constitute an intrusion by the Commission into highly sensitive
internal state affairs." 9 However, they state that the Commission's
recommendations are purely permissive.'
But if a state fails to follow
the recommendations, and a complaining Compact member shows
waste, the offending state could face base and supplemental
apportionment reductions. Ultimately, it amounts to a choice by a nonenforcing state as to whether it wants to comply with the Commission's
recommended standards and enforcement authority, or "risk the
predilections and limited knowledge in the field of the nine United
States Supreme Court Justices," in addition to the associated cost of
federal litigation.'
ARTICLE VI: WATER QUALITY PROTECTION PROGRAM
The Council administers the Water Quality Protection Program with
authorization under the program to: (1) establish and enforce water
quality standards and waste-load allocations; (2) enforce National
Pollution Discharge Elimination System ("NPDES") permits under the
Clean Water Act; (3) assume jurisdiction to abate existing interstate
pollution; and (4) control or prevent future pollution whenever it
determines that pollution originated within the flowing streams of the
122
basin.

The Commentary notes that, prior to the CWA, the federal
common law of nuisance governed interstate pollution. 123 After the
enactment of the CWA, the Court concluded the CWA preempted
conditions on the issuance of NPDES permits in an upstream state, 2 4
thus requiring the discharger to comply with downstream water quality
standards. 125 Moreover, the EPA can delegate implementation and
enforcement to the states because the states are more
likely to enforce
26
their own quality standards on an upstream polluter.
The Compact's approach addresses situations where the EPA does
not delegate authority to the signatory state, or when the signatory state
fails to adequately enforce its delegated authority. 127 Alternatively, all

117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 55-56.

123. Id.
at 58.
124.

Id.at 58-59 (citing Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 317 (1981)).

125. Id.
59-60 (citing Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 503 U.S. 91 (1992)).
126. Id.
at 59.
127.

Id.at 61.
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signatories can hand over their delegated authority to the Commission
for collective enforcement.'2 8 In either case, the Commission, not the
EPA or the state, would have authority to assume jurisdiction to enforce
CWA provisions. To buttress their arguments in favor of Compact CWA
enforcement, the authors note that the majority of Western states have
already received delegated enforcement authority from the EPA.
However, Article VI does not usurp the EPA's or the states' authority.'29
Instead, it coordinates effective implementation of the CWA among
signatory parties and provides broad supplemental authority to the
Commission. 3 0
ARTICLE VII: WATER RESOURCES MANAGEMENT PROGRAM
The Council administers the Water Resources Management
Program. The program oversees new water resource development
projects within the Compact basin, including major new surface
diversions or subsurface extractions, interstate transfers, and related
The Commission retains authority to review
operational guidelines.'
these projects.' 32
Within two years of the effective date, signatory parties must submit
the following: (1) a five-year estimate of specific project categories of
reasonable beneficial uses, including ISF; (2) the underlying
assumptions of this estimate; (3) an estimate of water supplies available
to meet the projects' requirements; and (4) plans to augment
Based on the signatory parties'
transferred water supplies. 133
submissions, the Commission must create a basin-wide plan to manage
water resources and prioritize construction or implementation of the
proposed state water projects." The Commission must also study and
encourage conjunctive use of both natural and artificial storage facilities
for storing and managing basin water without regard to ownership or
situs within the boundaries of individual signatories. 13 5 Further, if a
significant conflict arises after state legislative approval, the Commission
will consult with the Army Corps of Engineers and then proceed to
construct and operate flood control projects."' Additionally, the
Commission has the authority to establish standards for land use within
the basin for lands that are subject to flooding. 13
The Commentary notes that all states engage in some degree of
water resource planning, but also recognizes that there is likely no
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meaningful interstate collaboration in this regard." a
Therefore,
suboptimal results occur with regard to placement, timing, scope, and
character of water projects between states.'
The Compact seeks to
change this by granting to the Commission the 'modest' role of
coordinating signatory state activities, but the Commission does not
have to create a comprehensive plan. 4 ° Rather, the Compact provides a
forum for each signatory party to review other signatory parties'
proposed projects and programs,
and to make recommendations for
4
mutually beneficial adjustments.' '

ARTICLE VIII: ENFORCEMENT OF COMPACT OBLIGATIONS AND
RESOLUTION OF OTHER DISPUTES
The Commission has authority to enforce Compact obligations
when a signatory, or group of signatories, alleges that another signatory
party is either not maintaining required stream flows or impermissibly
exceeding its base or supplemental apportionments.'4 2 In the event of
such a dispute, the accused signatory can either concede the allegations
or contest them. 43
If a party concedes the allegations, it must
implement a Commission-approved remedial plan, which then absolves
the party of any liability to other signatories (but not to private parties)
and further Commission sanction.
However, if a party chooses to contest the allegations, the
Commission first refers the matter to either the Council or the Division,
depending on the subject matter of the dispute.'45 If no resolution
materializes within forty-five days after referral, the parties must then
seek alternative dispute resolution ("ADR").

4

ADR consists of either

non-binding mediation or binding arbitration
before the
Commission.' 47 If the parties engage in ADR, neither party niay
proceed with litigation until the ADR process has ended. If a party
proceeds with litigation before completing ADR, the breaching party
must pay all litigation expenses for both sides. 148 Failure to reach a
resolution authorizes the Commission to impose sanctions, including:
(1). suspension of the alleged offending party's voting rights; (2)
suspension of ongoing or planned Commission projects, or programs
from which the alleged offender would receive a benefit; and/or (3)
seek injunctive relief to remedy the alleged violation and seek
Completion of the ADR proceeding
appropriate damages. 49
138. Id.at 66.
139. Id.

140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.

Id.
Id.at 67.
Id.at 69-71.
Id.
Id.
Id.
at 73.
Id.
Id.
Id.at 69-71.
Id.

Issue 2

BOOK NOTES

constitutes final agency action on the part of the Commission,
regardless of the outcome. 5 °
The Commentary reveals that the authors took this approach in
light of several recent Supreme Court cases, adjudicating compacts
outside the Equitable Apportionment Doctrine.151 Many Western
compacts require unanimity among signatories for official action to
enforce obligations upon an individual member, which effectively
bestows the offender with a veto power.'52 Typically, the Court then
becomes involved, which can be equally expensive and lengthy as an
equitable apportionment action."' The cases cited in the Commentary
give credence to the authors' notion that if the parties can work out a
resolution, or, alternatively, concede truthful allegations and comply
with the Commission's resolution plans, the parties avoid significant
waste and inefficiency. 5 4 However, the Compact stresses the need for a
strong Commission with adequate enforcement authority.155
With regard to the adoption of ADR as the ultimate administrative
resolution method, the authors' Commentary points to recent cases
where the Court consented to ADR procedures between states in
compact disputes.156 In general, however, the Compact places a
mandatory duty upon signatory states to first seek resolution pursuant
to Compact provisions, or face exorbitant dual litigation costs. 5 ' The
ultimate goal is to keep parties engaged in good faith negotiations until
the parties reach an ADR resolution or negotiated settlement.'58
Some commentators criticize this dispute resolution scheme as
lacking certainty because it allows the parties to choose all of the
characteristics of the ADR procedure.15 9 However, the authors respond
that discussions between the parties in choosing the ADR format may be
conducive to settlement. 1" Of course, after the exhaustion of the ADR
process, parties can seek resolution in a court of competent jurisdiction
61
without the fear of paying the opposing party's attorney's fees.'
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ARTICLE IX INTERAGENCY COORDINATION AND PUBLIC
PARTICIPATION
Since a primary goal of the Compact is to promote interagency
cooperation, the Commission, Council, and Division representatives are
responsible for maintaining liaison with their respective constituents
The
and obtaining a consensus regarding disputed issues. 162
Commission also has the obligation to appoint a multi-interest, multidisciplinary Advisory Committee comprised of qualified public agency
representatives with interests in the basin. 163 The Commission must also
maintain a public information program, including the publication of an
annual report that includes financial information and a discussion of
Commission activities. 164
The Commentary notes that the Advisory Committee's major goal is
to promote legitimacy and transparency with respect to Compact
operations, which are essential to stakeholder approval and
involvement.'6 5 By acknowledging that management of water resources
will necessarily be divisive, the Advisory Committee serves as the primary
166
portal for the public to engage in policy and implementation debates.
ARTICLE X: BUDGETING AND FUNDING
The Commission must adopt an annual capital 67 and operating 68
budget. Following the Commission's adoption of the budgets, the
Commission assesses to signatories their share of project costs.

69

A

signatory's failure to pay this assessment authorizes the Commission to
suspend the delinquent signatory's voting rights, cancel or suspend
supplemental
projects,
or
reduce
ongoing
or ,planned
apportionments. a'"
Independent auditors scrutinize the financial
statements of the Commission for inclusion in the annual report,17
which effectively promotes transparency, credibility, and legitimacy. 72
The Commentary asserts that conferring broad financial powers to the
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Commission to approve supplemental apportionment prices, as well as
to use fees, cost sharing, and taxation, minimizes the impact on the
state treasuries of the signatories. 173 In the event of a budget deficit, the
based on
signatories equally share the total burden of the shortfall,
174
either total population or total land area within the basin.
Some Commentators have criticized as "draconian" the possible
sanctions upon parties who fail to pay their assessments. 175 However,
the authors warn that weakening the sanctions for delinquency might
- receiving
provide an incentive to the signatories to act as "free riders"
176
benefits from the Compact, but not paying their fair share.
ARTICLE XI: RELATIONSHIP OF COMPACT TO EXISTING LAW
In Article XI, the authors undertake an extensive preemption
analysis of both state and federal law. The authors also acknowledge
that states, the federal government, and courts could intentionally or
inadvertently modify the Compact by amending or enacting statutes
and by rendering judicial decisions. 177 Significantly, provisions of the
Compact supersede any present or future state or tribal laws that are
"irreconcilably inconsistent" with the Compact. 17 The same is true for
any present federal laws. 1 79 The Commentary notes that once the
signatories ratify a compact and Congress consents, it becomes the law
of the United States 8 ° through operation of the Supremacy Clause,
the language of the compact or
unless explicitly exempted by 181
Congressional consent legislation.
With regard to future federal laws, however, the preemption analysis
is not as clear. Regulations, statutes, and judicial or administrative
decisions that are irreconcilably inconsistent with the Compact may
supersede its provisions.' 82 If federal law does, in fact, preempt all or a
portion of the Compact, the signatories may elect to terminate the
Compact via a majority vote. 83 Furthermore, the Commission shall
undertake a detailed analysis of which federal laws, regulations,
contracts, conflicts of interests, financial disclosure, open meetings,
advisory committees, disclosures of information, judicial review, and
related matters are applicable to the activities of the Commission, the
Council, or the Division. 84 In all situations, federal courts have
exclusive jurisdiction over any action of the Commission, and can
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review any provision of the Compact inasmuch as it conflicts with future
federal laws.' 85 Except where expressly provided for in the Compact or
upon an unanimous signatory vote, the Compact shall not adversely
affect any interstate water allocation or interstate compact decision by
the Court in an equitable apportionment or interstate compact action
made prior to the effective date of the Compact.'8 6
The Commentary acknowledges that federal preemption remains
an inherent risk.'87 There is some criticism of the Compact for
expressly acknowledging this risk, as it would appear counterproductive
for Congress to consent to compacts inconsistent with federal law or to
later enact laws inconsistent with compact provisions. 8 8 The authors
acknowledge, however, that Congress has expressly reserved the right to
revoke, alter, or amend its consent in two-thirds of all compacts to
which it is a party.' 89 In addition, the authors note Congress can reverse
its decision to amend legislation because subsequent Congresses do not
have to adhere to the intent of a preceding Congress. 190
The reality is that subsequently enacted federal legislation has
superseded or adversely affected numerous compacts.1"' The authors
conclude that irreconcilable and inconsistent federal laws enacted
following consent of Congress to the Compact "would probably
supersede the Compact.' ' 92 The authors reach this conclusion based on
the Riverside Irrga on Disrict v. Stipo, and Riverside Imigadon District
v. Andrews cases.1 93 In the Riverside cases, the irrigation district sought
a NPDES permit to discharge sand and gravel into the stream during
construction of a dam from the Army Corps of Engineers.9 The Army
Corps refused to issue the permit, citing the Endangered Species Act
and the CWA, which together imposed a duty on upstream parties to
protect the water quality of downstream users.1 95 The basic proposition,
according to the authors, is that interstate water compacts are subject to
the provisions of subsequently enacted federal legislation, regardless of
the impact of such legislation on Compact apportionments or on
programs approved by an earlier Congress.1"
The authors respond to this reality by acknowledging that Compact
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parties cannot alter Congress' determinations, but they do have
authority to terminate the Compact.'9 7 Thus, the hope is that this
ability to terminate would give Congress pause and provide an incentive
for Congress to pay close attention198to the possible effects -on the
Compact on any proposed legislation.
CONCLUSION
The Compact is an excellent example of thoughtful and scholarly
collaboration produced by legal and scientific experts in the field of
transboundary water resources. Ultimately, like any model statute, its
wholesale import or piecemeal adoption of desirable provisions by the
states engaged in interstate disputes will remain unknown until
significant interstate water allocation renegotiations occur.
As the introduction notes, while compact disputes are increasing,
general interstate allocation disputes between states are also increasing,
but at a higher rate. The antiquated and cumbersome legal frameworks
of the original compacts are approaching obsolescence and proving
unworkable in lieu of today's scientific understanding of the
hydrological connectivity of the water basins. Therefore, the Compact's
learned integration of conservation and ISF into its basic principles will
provide persuasive evidence to future interstate agreement drafters of
the Model Compact's possible effectiveness. The authors hope to
provide a powerful incentive to those engaged in interstate allocation
disputes to turn to compacts, and to avoid Constitutional litigation.
Ultimately, "compact and interstate allocation issues are never truly
resolved, they are only managed over time."'99 What is clear, however, is
that the Compact provides a readily adoptable and comprehensive
approach for the states, the federal government, and tribal nations in
managing their increasingly scarce water supplies.
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